24 June 2025

Mike Bloomberg

Recommendation

Mike Bloomberg’s story ranks as one of modern business and political history’s most inspiring and instructive tales. Take an average, middle-class man with uncommon vigor. Then, imbue him with the discipline and confidence to take maximum advantage of the great opportunities he encountered in college, Wall Street and, eventually, the electrified world of New York City politics. New York Times reporter Joyce Purnick’s fluid writing style makes this portrait of an ethical, tough, innovative leader flow seamlessly, so readers can easily enjoy and absorb its themes and stories. BooksInShort recommends her breezy, deft, comprehensive presentation of Bloomberg’s uplifting life story to executives, political strategists and aspiring leaders.

Take-Aways

  • In 1966, Mike Bloomberg, then 23, became the first M.B.A. ever to be hired by Salomon Brothers.
  • When Salomon fired Bloomberg in 1981, he used his $10 million severance payment to start a new firm.
  • His company revolutionized the investment technology business by using PCs that combined trading, analytics and data in a single leased unit.
  • Bloomberg entered politics in 2001 when he ran for mayor of New York City and won.
  • He built political connections by donating millions to charities, mostly in New York.
  • By 2008, Bloomberg’s company employed 10,500 people working in 63 countries.
  • He donated $235 million to charity that year, perhaps making him the nation’s largest single donor. By 2009, he had donated $500 million to Johns Hopkins University.
  • He persuaded the City Council to alter term limit regulations so he could run for a third term as mayor, which he won.
  • Bloomberg’s personal net worth is an estimated $20 billion.
  • He is disciplined, competitive, focused on self-improvement and famed for his large ego.

Summary

The Unlikely Mayor

Michael R. Bloomberg was born in Medford, Massachusetts, near Boston, into a middle-class Jewish family. His father, William, a corporate accountant, met his mother, Charlotte, an auditor, when they both worked for a large dairy company. William was doting and permissive, so Charlotte played a larger role in disciplining their son. Years later she recalled Mike as an organized, determined and headstrong kid. His high school classmates considered him nerdy, given that he was a debate club member and president of the Slide Rule Club. He became an Eagle Scout a year younger than the minimum required age. Today, classmates remember him as bright and reserved, but independent. Bloomberg says he learned his forthright, unvarnished style from his mother who told him and his sister, Marjorie, to “persevere in the face of adversity” and not to let trouble derail their plans. Accept negative events and get on with your life, she would say.

New York mayor Michael “Bloomberg built himself a life that even a novelist would have trouble imagining, one that would eventually allow him to do almost anything he wanted.”

Bloomberg did not become a serious student until after his father died at age 57 in 1963, making Mike the head of the family. A Johns Hopkins University junior at the time, Bloomberg soon became a more focused scholar. He graduated with an engineering degree and went to Harvard Business School. After earning his M.B.A., Bloomberg considered real estate and engineering, but on a friend’s advice, he went for an interview at Salomon Brothers & Hutzler, then a “little bond trading firm.” In 1966, at age 23, he became the first M.B.A. that Salomon ever hired. Bloomberg excelled in the atmosphere of the bare-knuckled trading firm, which was known as a “meritocracy” that promoted successful traders. Within a year, he moved into the securities trading unit. By 1973, he was the leader of the “equities desk,” a Salomon general partner and a wealthy man. After 13 years, office politics forced Bloomberg out of his trading position. Salomon transferred him to its less prestigious “information services” or technical support department.

“The inhabitants of Bloomberg’s World see themselves as apolitical and altruistic, virtuous even when they employ the rough tactics of conventional politicians, because they are serving only the public interest.”

This was clearly a demotion, but Bloomberg – by then married and a father – said he never considered resigning. Instead, he turned the insult into an opportunity. He noted the emerging importance of the new desktop computer and he focused on ways that he could make Salomon’s dinosaur computers, called Quotrons, more advanced and interactive. He soon developed extra pages for the Quotron, enabling it to calculate the effects of hypothetical changes in interest rates and bond prices. While this addition became the prototype for the future Bloomberg business terminal, at the time Salomon relied on huge IBM mainframes, forcing traders to request programming time to make needed investment calculations. Bloomberg’s push for more desktop computers upset senior management, but he argued that more PCs would increase the efficiency of traders and the entire company.

“Mike Bloomberg was one difficult kid in school, his performance lackluster, his conduct minor-league disruptive.”

Bloomberg suffered a rude awakening in 1981 when the Phibro Corporation, a trading firm, bought Salomon. While other partners received huge payouts, Bloomberg and five other general partners were fired. He left the firm with about $10 million (twice the amount he would have received if he had resigned before the buyout, which he had considered).

Changing the Game

Using his severance money, Bloomberg launched Innovative Market Systems (now called Bloomberg L.P.) to lease smart PC-based terminals – basically expansions of the machine he developed at Salomon – to subscribers for less than $1,000 a month. The revolutionary machines popularized and democratized electronic trading, and provided instant financial data. By 2009, the company had 10,500 employees working in 63 countries to support its trading terminals and its 280,000 worldwide “subscribers” who paid an average of $1,590 a month.

“The company was built off of Mike Bloomberg’s ego, which is very big.” (Wall Street executive Douglas Taylor)

The comprehensive, interactive terminals, soon called “Bloombergs,” trounced their competitors from Dow Jones and Reuters. Bloomberg “reinvented the field,” says New York Times columnist Floyd Norris. The revolutionary machines created a trading sensation by linking computer technology and trading. He innovatively integrated bond and stock data, news, 24-hour technical support, trading and investment analytics. His attractive machines proved invaluable to traders when then-Federal Reserve chair Paul Volker allowed interest rates to float more freely. This made bonds more volatile, giving traders a critical need for bond-specific data.

“Bloomberg’s advantage was not only a matter of timing – he had gotten out ahead of everyone – but of culture and temperament.”

Bloomberg leased his machines to clients in a complete package with databases and extra features; the company never unbundled the elements in its set-up or sold its machines. As an expensive, premium product, it created an elite brand. The successful firm continued to grow. By 1997, Forbes magazine estimated Bloomberg’s net worth at $1.3 billion. (By 2008, this figure skyrocketed to more than $20 billion. Calculating its exact value is difficult since he keeps his company privately held.) As his company expanded and prospered in the 1990s – when Bloomberg L.P. spawned Bloomberg News, Bloomberg Radio, Bloomberg TV, Bloomberg Personal (a rare failure) and the monthly magazine Bloomberg Markets – he decided to change careers. In 1997, Mike Bloomberg told friends he was considering a move into politics.

The Billionaire Underdog

In characteristic style, Bloomberg went after the prize he sought, but he faced many challenges. Newly divorced, he was not part of the Manhattan social circuit, which provided access to the upper strata of power and culture. To start his political ascent, he met with prominent women, like Barbara Walters and Beverly Sills, and soon joined the boards of the New York Public Library, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, Lincoln Center and the Central Parks Conservancy. He donated $100 million to charities, primarily in New York. In June 2001, the man who had never held public office and who had distanced himself from Gotham’s Gordian knot of political, ethnic and racial groups, formally announced that he was the Republican candidate for mayor.

“He created sort of a walled garden, with his I-am-all-you need philosophy. He came to the market with an idea that one terminal could provide all the data you could need, allow you to analyze it on one screen, so one trader could look at a variety of different markets.”

Bloomberg was an unlikely candidate. He was an insensitive, politically incorrect man who spoke his mind. He was naive about his very troubled metropolis (though he soon “hired an army of consultants and tutors”), unknown to its electorate and a Republican outsider in a Democratic city. Despite his wealth, most New Yorkers had never heard of him and worse, he was an unremarkable speaker. His opponents, especially Democrat Mark Green, were experienced, popular public figures and veteran campaigners. The Democratic Party primary was set for September 11, 2001, when terrorist attacks paralyzed the city and froze the campaign. By the date of the rescheduled primary on September 25, Green held a large lead in the polls. However, party infighting, Green’s perceived arrogance and a growing sense that New York needed a business executive to help it rebuild pushed Bloomberg ahead. It also did not hurt that he spent $74 million on the campaign (plus his charitable contributions). On Election Day in 2001, Bloomberg’s long shot paid off. He beat Green by a scant 35,539 of the more than 1.5 million votes cast.

The Mogul Mayor

As an entrepreneur, Bloomberg moved quickly when he became mayor. He pushed to revitalize the public health system, to renovate dilapidated neighborhoods and to make the police more responsive. He advocated transparency at City Hall and disregarded patronage. But the citizens did not grow to love him. Breaking a campaign promise, he raised property taxes. By 2002, 46% of New Yorkers disapproved of his actions. In 2003, he closed six fire stations and his approval rating fell to 24%. But his support inside City Hall was very high. He did not micromanage, and his department heads had final authority. He neglected lobbyists and made decisions based on a proposal’s merits. He was loyal to his appointees. He named two family members (his daughter and sister) to City Hall positions at $1-per-year salaries, while he wrangled concessions from the powerful teacher’s union and boosted the confidence of small-business owners.

“New Yorkers knew little about the inner workings of Bloomberg’s government, or much else about it.”

Then, Bloomberg focused on bringing the 2012 Olympics to New York, mustering a Herculean effort to gain the backing of state legislators and apathetic New Yorkers. Problems emerged. Bloomberg and deputy mayor, Daniel Doctoroff, a former Bloomberg L.P. executive, failed to get a consensus of key New York groups about building an Olympic stadium on Manhattan’s West side. When the plan arrived in Albany, Democratic powerbrokers derailed a key vote and the plan died. The 2012 Olympics went to London. The Olympic bid had become a political albatross that Bloomberg was glad to shed so he could focus on his 2005 re-election campaign against Fernando Ferrer, a weak Democrat. Ferrer’s half-hearted campaign never gained traction, yet Bloomberg still spent $85 million of his own money in the campaign, about $100 per voter – and $10 million more than he had spent in 2001.

“Bloomberg’s Zelig-like ability to fit in, to make himself part of a new universe, is evident throughout his adult life.”

The mayor then undertook his toughest challenges: making New York eco-friendly, limiting Manhattan car traffic, taking on school reform and tackling gun dealers. These efforts earned national attention. His timing was perfect for the 2008 presidential race, but no one knew if he wanted to be a candidate. And, if so, which political party would take him? Bloomberg had switched from being an early Democrat to being a Republican and, in June 2007, he became an independent. Abruptly, the mayor had become a presidential mystery man. As an independent, Bloomberg had a chance, if Democratic candidate Barack Obama failed to attract independents, who were Bloomberg’s targeted audience. But Obama’s surprise caucus victory in early January 2008 deflated Bloomberg’s nascent campaign. Republican candidate John McCain ended the mayor’s bid when he appealed to independents for their support.

King Bloomberg

In 2009, after eight years as mayor, Bloomberg became restless and cranky as he pursued a third term. New York had a two-year mayoral term-limit law that it would have to change to allow Bloomberg to run again. This looked as if it would require a complex referendum where Bloomberg would have to reverse his support of term limits. It was a tug of war. Close friends said he now resembled the average, deal-making politico, someone Bloomberg had vowed never to become. In the process, he was violating his own ethical standards. While business associates encouraged him to run, close political aides publicly urged Bloomberg to step down.

“Every setback became a platform for a new initiative, a springboard to a new adventure.”

But when major New York financial institutions failed in 2008, threatening Wall Street’s immense contribution to the local economy, Bloomberg saw the crisis as an opportunity. The looming recession gave him the excuse to advocate revoking the eight-year term limit statute, so he could guide the city through another term as mayor and restore its financial stability. Backed by the major newspapers, Bloomberg avoided a public vote on changing the popular term-limit cap by getting the docile City Council to approve the change. The ploy evaded contentious public debate, though outraged citizens decried “King Bloomberg.” The $85-$100 million Bloomberg spent on his re-election campaign guaranteed that he would serve a third term.

The Money Enigma

While wealth is a powerful hammer in Bloomberg’s hands, his attitude toward money is more obscure. In 2008, he personally owned 92% of the $22.5-billion (2008 valuation) communication company that bears his name. Estimates put his present net worth at $23 billion. He may be the largest single charitable donor in the U.S., having given away $235 million in 2008. By 2009, he had donated a cumulative $500 million to Johns Hopkins, primarily to fund public health causes.

“He is not warm, beloved or glib in a profession that demands all three.”

People close to Bloomberg say he is goal-oriented, disciplined and competitive. He has a large ego and focuses on self-improvement. He succeeded in business and politics by valuing new ideas, taking risks, and skillfully using his fortune to forge and buttress new relationships. Even as a young man, he was in constant motion. As an executive and a politician, he used private and public social gatherings to build connections. To enter New York politics, he became a Manhattan social whirlwind, but once elected, he became more selective. In his view of loyalty, you were either in his circle or out of it. He saw employees who left his company as traitors. As mayor, he has a close circle of dedicated, long-time friends whom he rewards handsomely for their services. He exercises immense self-control to separate his personal life from his public role. The mayor’s key trait is adaptability. In his personal and professional life, he shows a keen ability to assess situations and strategize to seize control, even over New York City, three times in a row.

About the Author

New York Times reporter Joyce Purnick wrote the paper’s award-winning, Metro Matters column for 10 years. She joined the paper in 1979, after stints at the New York Post and New York magazine, becoming the first woman to head the Times’ City Hall bureau and its Metro department. She has, so far, covered six mayors of New York.


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Mike Bloomberg

Book Mike Bloomberg

Money, Power, Politics

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24 June 2025

Misadventures of the Most Favored Nations

Recommendation

Veteran journalist Paul Blustein blames half the 2008 economic meltdown – the non-Wall Street half – on dysfunctional global trade policies, and then he explains why. World trade is an arcane topic, complete with mysterious acronyms, complex rules, and negotiators with huge egos and serpentine negotiating positions pushed by antagonistic nations. In an increasingly global economy, trade negotiations are never simple. Even so, Blustein manages to tell this provocative, complex, depressing story as engagingly as possible. At times the book bogs down in negotiating points that only trade technocrats will appreciate, but Blustein fleshes out the story by capturing the quirky, sometimes volatile, personalities involved. Accordingly, BooksInShort recommends his book to those who can’t get enough about world trade. If you want all the ins and outs, you’ll be very happy here.

Take-Aways

  • To preclude the trade protectionism that fueled the Great Depression and World War II, 23 nations signed on to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948.
  • Despite GATT’s limitations, economists credit it with raising productivity and promoting worldwide economic expansion in the second half of the 20th century.
  • GATT’s successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO), enforces global trade rules.
  • With 153 members, each with an equal vote, the WTO runs on “consensus by exhaustion.”
  • Trade reform could help the 2.8 billion people who live on less than $2 daily.
  • Anti-WTO protestors in Seattle successfully derailed the organization’s 1999 meeting.
  • The Doha Round of negotiations, meant to aid developing countries, failed its objectives.
  • The rising economies of China, India and Brazil, among others, challenge the power of the “Quad”: the U.S., the EU, Japan and Canada.
  • U.S. anti-dumping duties have doubled the price of imported Italian pasta.
  • Despite marathon talks, trade negotiations fail due to personality conflicts, power mongering, poor strategies, missed opportunities and imbalances of power.

Summary

“Most Favored Nations”

The World Trade Organization (WTO), composed of 153 member nations, sets international trade rules with the goal of promoting global economic stability. Unlike the 10,000-employee World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with its 2,600-member workforce, the WTO gets by with only a few hundred staffers. Yet it wields arguably greater power by enforcing trade rules that affect the economies of both industrialized and nonindustrialized countries. As true of any real democracy, the WTO’s structure makes it difficult to govern. Member nations share equal voting rights, and every member must adopt all WTO rules for them to pass; so any one member, regardless of its size or clout, can thwart a proposal. But membership does have its privileges: All WTO countries benefit from “most favored nation” status and thus enjoy equal trade advantages.

The Doha Round

The WTO member nations – then numbering 142 – met in Doha, Qatar, soon after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Growing terrorism fears and a world economy heading toward recession pressed the participants to find ways to broaden trade liberalization’s benefits to the developing world. They knew that reforming trade limits and rules could help the 2.8 billion people in the world who live on less than $2 daily. The World Bank estimated that enacting new trade policies could reduce poverty’s numbers by 320 million people over the following 15 years.

“Globalization moves in fits and starts, sometimes three steps forward, sometimes two steps back; sometimes at a gallop, sometimes at a crawl.”

After all-night negotiations that extended their self-imposed deadline by 20 hours, WTO members set the “Doha Development Agenda,” which called for freeing trade by 2004 and providing special agricultural assistance to developing nations. Farm trade issues have always been especially contentious because industrialized nations’ agricultural subsidies give their farmers significant advantage in world markets.

“But among sensible and knowledgeable people, nobody disputes that, overall, the expansion of trade has been a force for growth and higher living standards.”

But seven years of Doha Round negotiations have led only to disputes and disagreements with little in meaningful trade reform. Subsequent WTO meetings in 2003 (Cancun), 2004 (Geneva), 2005 (Hong Kong), 2006 (Geneva) and 2007 (Potsdam) failed to produce significant change. Why? Personality conflicts, power mongering, poor strategies, missed opportunities and the rise of developing nations all played a part. The 2008 global recession compounded this failure by triggering new trade restrictions in both poor and rich nations, raising the specter of protectionism. The WTO has been hamstrung since 2001, and more than 200 bilateral and regional deals since then have undermined the authority of “the ultimate safekeeper of open world markets.”

“For all its faults, the WTO is a crucial linchpin of stability in the global economy.”

Countries such as Egypt, Brazil, India, China and South Africa have unbalanced the political power once enjoyed exclusively by the “Quad,” the U.S., Canada, Japan and the European Union. Because the WTO operates on “consensus by exhaustion,” increased trade friction among developed and developing nations will likely further affect trade liberalization.

A Bumpy Ride from the Beginning

Despite fits and starts, 23 countries signed on to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948. Under the leadership of the Quad, GATT combined mercantilism with free trade aspirations. It advanced the notion of “most favored nation” and, over several rounds of talks from the 1940s to the 1980s, succeeded in reducing tariffs on manufactured goods from 35% to 6.5%. By 1979, 100 countries were participating in GATT trade talks. However, protectionist forces prevented certain industries, such as U.S. textiles and European agriculture, from being included in GATT talks. Also, GATT maintained no enforcement mechanisms. Despite such limitations, economists acknowledge GATT’s success in raising productivity and promoting worldwide economic expansion in the postwar era.

“The terrorist attacks...offered a newly compelling rationale for how trade – and in particular, the WTO – could serve America’s security interests as well as its commercial ones.”

In late December 1993, 117 nations signed on to the largest worldwide trade agreement ever negotiated, the WTO. This more robust trade authority could mandate member compliance, though countries accused of breaching WTO rules could appeal to its Appellate Body, whose rulings were final. More importantly, member nations could raise trade sanctions against any partner that refused to accept the binding verdict. The WTO was also set up to encompass trade issues in “agriculture, intellectual property, services and health standards.” By the second half of the 1990s, the WTO gained more clout when China began the process of full membership.

“So here’s a truly frightening thought: The fate of open global markets may depend on decades more of Doha Round-style chaos, uncontrollability and dysfunctionality.”

However, “a backlash was brewing”; critics increasingly charged that the WTO promoted pro-corporate, anti-environmental, Western agendas. Those criticisms came to a head during the WTO’s meeting in Seattle in 1999. There, “students, labor unionists, environmentalists, faith groups, human rights activists, animal rights supporters, Tibetan monks and graying veterans of the ’60s” converged to derail the summit. But the successful protests weren’t the only reason the talks failed; internal squabbling among the participants did as much to doom the meeting.

“Democracy and inclusiveness are desirable goals, but so is efficiency in coming to decisions.”

To restore the WTO’s standing, Director-General Mike Moore set the agenda for its next session in November 2001 in Qatar: Focus on improving economic growth in developing nations. Trade experts differed on how to achieve this noble goal. One school, endorsed by the World Bank, maintained that increasing exports and imports (as a percentage of gross domestic product) while reducing tariffs would raise living standards. Others contended that trade liberalization alone was not an elixir for economic growth.

“The G-20 continued to gain momentum and new members, heightening the prospects for a titanic clash between high-income and low-income nations.”

In January 2001, when Bob Zoellick assumed his post as U.S. trade representative under President George W. Bush, he supported bilateral agreements with any nation that welcomed U.S. corporations. Zoellick, a workaholic, found a kindred spirit in Pascal Lamy, the European trade commissioner. They worked to advance trade relations between the U.S. and the EU, the two regions that produce 40% of world output. They diverged, though, in their stance on agriculture; Lamy resisted easing entry to European farming markets, while Zoellick was fond of asking, “How much more food can Americans eat?”

“Global trade talks often follow a pattern of death and resurrection in which a highly publicized falling-out tends to force negotiators toward convergence at their next meeting.”

In preparing for the Doha sessions, the lesser-developed nations unexpectedly balked at the proposed agenda, threatening to sink the meeting. But Zoellick used the 9/11 terrorist attacks to link liberalized global trade with security, and he prevailed. In addition, a World Bank study caught free traders’ attention. It predicted that, if all barriers and subsidies disappeared, by 2015 global incomes would grow by $830 billion a year, and two-thirds of that increase would go to poor countries.

“The key division at Cancun was between the can-do and the won’t-do...the U.S. will not wait. We will move toward free trade with can-do countries.” (Bob Zoellick)

At Doha, the Americans’ most contentious issue – aside from post-9/11 security concerns – centered on their mission to pass anti-dumping duties. Dumping occurs when foreigners sell products in the U.S. at unfairly low prices, putting U.S.-manufactured goods at a competitive disadvantage. Economists contend that anti-dumping laws smack of protectionism, but the laws are a favorite of the U.S. Congress, which believes the rules guarantee “a level playing field.” For example, in 1996, the U.S. accused Italian pasta producers of dumping and added a 47% duty, doubling the price of Italian pasta in the U.S. In the face of mounting pressure led by Chile, Japan and South Korea, the U.S. agreed to slight changes in anti-dumping laws that would appease both its challengers and Congress.

Reality Check

Though Doha ended on a note of cooperation, more specific agreements would have to wait until the 2003 WTO talks in Cancun, Mexico. Before that session, trade representatives from the U.S. and the EU drafted a proposal that would lower the farm subsidies of developing nations but largely maintain their own. Brazil and India opposed the plan and led a group of roughly 20 emerging countries to counter the U.S. and Europe. Nicknamed the G-20 (not the G-20 that assembled in 2008), this new voting bloc represented “more than half the world’s population.”

“In many instances, rich countries comply fairly readily with WTO judgments rendered against them in cases brought by developing nations.”

At Cancun in September 2003, Zoellick met with the G-20 reluctantly; he didn’t want to lend credibility to what he then considered a temporary, fragile alliance. After listening quietly to the group’s demands, he asked what they were willing to offer in exchange – he caught them flat-footed. Tensions further increased over the U.S.’s successful effort to beat back cotton subsidy cuts. An impasse emerged as WTO delegates haggled over key proposals, including “investment, competition, government procurement and trade facilitation,” prompting Cancun Chairman Luis Derbez to terminate the conference abruptly. The EU saw the sudden move as a U.S. ploy to save face over the cotton controversy. Others felt it put the WTO’s viability into question.

“So much market opening has occurred during the past few decades that the low-hanging fruit is gone; the barriers that remain are the ones that are the most politically intractable.”

Cotton came to the fore again in October 2003 before a WTO tribunal, the “Dispute Settlement Understanding,” in Geneva. At issue: whether U.S. cotton subsidies reduced prices worldwide, damaging non-U.S. cotton farmers. The Brazilians – represented by American lawyers – won their case, and, in April 2004, also prevailed against EU sugar subsidies. The U.S. suffered defeat again in March 2004 when the tiny nations of Antigua and Barbuda (combined populations: 69,000) brought a suit before the WTO that concerned online gambling. (As of spring 2009, the U.S. still had not complied with either the Brazilian or the Antiguan decision.)

“His Holiness, Pope Bob”

Zoellick, angered by the disaster in Cancun, continued to pursue ambitious bilateral and regional free-trade agreements, in order to “reward cooperative countries and punish uncooperative ones.” The accords were built on existing WTO pacts and buttressed U.S. foreign policy goals. However, academics, legislators and critics questioned whether Zoellick’s bilateral deals hurt multilateralism and undermined the WTO. Zoellick rebuffed his detractors.

“Might the world’s poor have been better off if, instead of spending all that money on negotiations for a development round, the funds had simply been disbursed in the form of aid?”

The Bush administration advocated expanding the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to the entire Western Hemisphere. In November 2003, the U.S. proposed that 34 nations give admission to one another’s service and investment firms, while also securing intellectual property rights protection. Brazil and Argentina opposed the proposals, Brazil objecting to the “U.S. annexation of Latin America.” When stern U.S. cajoling could not budge them, the deal died.

“The trading system is at risk of joining the financial system in crisis.”

Zoellick next took the political risk, in the 2004 election year, of resurrecting the failed Cancun WTO initiatives. He proposed that the U.S. cut export subsidies by a specific date and change its farm policy. In turn, the EU offered to eliminate export subsidies and liberalize trade access for the world’s least developed nations, primarily those in sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean. After more contentious meetings, Zoellick asserted his leadership and wrote “about a dozen amendments” that revived the talks. By July 2004, the WTO was back in business.

Impasse

By that autumn, both Zoellick and Lamy had left their posts; a re-elected George W. Bush made Zoellick a State Department deputy secretary. Rob Portman, a well-liked, even-tempered Republican House member, replaced Zoellick as U.S. trade representative. The U.S. rallied for internal support to abolish U.S. farm subsidies in order to revive the deadlocked Doha talks. To complicate matters, though, a 2005 World Bank study found that nations that depended on food imports would be disadvantaged, rather than helped, by the complete elimination of farming subsidies. Without the excess of aid-supported crops, prices would rise, adding to poor countries’ financial burdens. And the bank suffered a blow to its own credibility: It revised downward its 2001 forecast that free trade would lessen poverty by 320 million people. It now estimated that number to be only 12 million. Globalization’s detractors gloried in what they considered justification for their position.

More disagreements and bickering set the tone for the WTO’s late 2005 meetings in Hong Kong. The last main agreement centered on the EU keeping some tariffs in place until 2013, and not 2010, as the G-20 had demanded. In the words of a journalist paraphrasing Winston Churchill: “To sum up the meeting of World Trade Organization ministers in Hong Kong...rarely in the history of international negotiations have so many labored so long to produce so little.”

About the Author

Paul Blustein is an award-winning business journalist who has written for The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal.


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Misadventures of the Most Favored Nations

Book Misadventures of the Most Favored Nations

Clashing Egos, Inflated Ambitions, and the Great Shambles of the World Trade System

Public Affairs,


 



24 June 2025

Trade-Off

Recommendation

Technology journalist Kevin Maney coined the term “fidelity swap” to describe the choice consumers make between “convenience” and “fidelity,” which is the quality of the experience that a product or service provides. People make such trade-offs many times every day. To illustrate, consider whether you would rather watch the Yankees play live at Yankee Stadium or see the game from the comfort of your home? Would you rather enjoy the experience of browsing the aisles of your local bookstore or have the convenience of ordering books online? Products or services that lie on either extreme of the fidelity versus convenience continuum are most successful, while those that offer neither high quality nor extreme ease of use fall into the “fidelity belly,” where they are doomed to mediocrity unless they can swim out. In his engaging book, Maney expertly uses numerous colorful case studies to explain the fidelity swap paradigm and lucidly demonstrates how to adopt it as a corporate strategy. BooksInShort recommends his work to businesspeople contemplating issues of price versus prestige, availability versus exclusivity, and what works in the market, what doesn’t and why.

Take-Aways

  • “The fidelity swap” is the buyer’s choice between “convenience” and “fidelity,” which encompasses the quality of the consumer’s experience with a product or service.
  • This swap offers a new context for analyzing marketing strategy and brand positioning.
  • Technological advances affect a product or service’s caliber or ease of use.
  • When a product or service has neither high quality nor high convenience, it falls into the “fidelity belly,” and must distinguish itself in one of these areas to get out.
  • Offering both high excellence and high convenience is not possible or desirable.
  • Every market segment has products that own the quality and convenience slots.
  • The social aspect of a product or service affects its popularity.
  • Two intangible traits, “aura” and “identity,” contribute to the buyer’s perception of a product’s superiority.
  • Occasionally, a “wrecking-ball moment” shakes up or redefines a market.
  • The fidelity versus convenience trade-off can help you detect openings in the market.

Summary

The Hollywood Conundrum

When director James Cameron and his creative team released the 3-D film Avatar, it became a giant hit. Moviemakers immediately lined up to produce more 3-D features. Why? Theater attendance has been falling for the past several years as people have faced the “fidelity swap,” the trade-off between either watching a film at home (“convenience”) or the experiential quality of viewing it in a theater (“fidelity”). At home, you can take breaks for a phone call or a bathroom run, and watch a movie on your own schedule, whereas going to the theater calls for traveling, standing in line and paying for tickets. As attendance figures prove, people now tend to opt for convenience instead of a great experience. Theaters are trapped in the “fidelity belly” because they offer neither convenience nor a great experience. Since the industry can’t make theaters more convenient, it is trying to improve the quality of the theater experience – hence, 3-D.

“We constantly, in our everyday lives, make trade-offs between the fidelity of an experience and its convenience.”

A conflict between fidelity and convenience occurs in every kind of business, so using the fidelity swap as a framework for marketing strategy provides businesspeople with a new paradigm for analyzing problems and positioning. This frame contradicts the traditional business model, which pursues both quality and convenience. In fact, the fidelity swap construct says this combination is unattainable and, ultimately, not desirable.

The Choice Between Convenience and a Quality Experience

People continually select between fidelity and convenience. Do you go to a ball game or watch it on TV? Do you pick up dinner from a fast food stand’s drive-up window or relax in a nice restaurant? People have always had to make such decisions, but the accelerating pace of technology pumps up the progression. Two other factors influence a product’s fidelity versus convenience position: “social accelerants” and “wrecking-ball moments.” Social accelerants capture the communal aspect of why someone buys an item. Some brands become extensions or expressions of social standing and, thus, are more desirable. Now and then, a “wrecking-ball moment” shakes up or resets a market. Digital cameras acted as a wrecking ball to the film-camera market; cellphone cameras whacked it again.

“This fidelity swap has been going on since humans invented commerce.”

The fidelity swap model has five elements:

  1. “Fidelity versus convenience” – People constantly choose between these two factors. Their choices may vary based on their circumstances, income, time pressures or age.
  2. “The tech effect” – Technological advances can alter a product’s quality and ease of use.
  3. “The fidelity belly” – When a product or service offers an unimpressive experience and isn’t convenient, it falls into “no-man’s land” and must find a way out.
  4. “The fidelity mirage” – Many companies strive to offer both fidelity and convenience, but that is a self-defeating goal. Convenience dilutes fidelity and vice versa.
  5. “Superfidelity or superconvenience” – These “winners” own either the fidelity position (Apple’s iPhone) or the convenience slot (Wal-Mart) in their markets.

Quality of Experience Against Ease of Use

The easier a product or service is to obtain and use, the more convenient it is. Convenient products may not receive fans’ love and admiration, but they satisfy buyers’ needs easily and affordably. For instance, automated teller machines (ATMs) are so handy they permanently changed how people bank. Price affects convenience in that cheaper items are easier to buy.

“All in all, the company that makes it the easiest for consumers to get what they want is hard to beat.”

In each market, some product holds the quality position. Only the most fundamental commodities, such as electricity, defy this rule. Two internal, intangible elements – “aura” and “identity” – contribute to the buyer’s perception of quality or high fidelity. “Aura” refers to the feeling of awe and privilege people link to a product. Walter Benjamin used the term “aura” to describe the difference between seeing a painting reprinted in a magazine and the elevated experience of viewing the original. The original evokes “a sense of awe and reverence for the work, the artist and the painting’s cultural significance,” while the reprint does not. Aura, a “perceived fidelity,” can be fickle. Today a certain restaurant is fashionable; tomorrow it’s passé. Using aura to capture the high-fidelity niche is a popular strategy. Beer companies use it all the time. Crocs, the brightly colored plastic gardening shoes, sold like crazy until they became so commonplace people no longer considered them hip. They lost their aura.

“It’s very hard to be both loved and needed, to be both high-fidelity and high-convenience.”

People tend to express their identities through their product choices, such as wearing fashionable clothing. That’s why people want to own distinctive assets, from an Ivy League education to an iPhone (at least before they became generally available).

The Fidelity Belly

Many new technologies live in the fidelity belly until consumers become aware of their superior quality or convenience. Products that started in the fidelity belly before they carved out a niche on one end of the spectrum include “digital cameras, HDTV, personal computers, cell phones, microwave ovens and home air conditioners.” “Technology and innovation” often change the fidelity versus convenience equation, so dominant firms should not risk complacency. Blockbuster held the convenience slot in film rental. Netflix movies-by-mail replaced it.

“When there’s a tie on fidelity, the most convenient version of that fidelity wins.”

Viewing your business through the lens of the fidelity swap offers an enlightening perspective. For example, consider the ways you can buy a book. You can browse a funky, independent bookstore, which most booklovers see as a high-quality experience. Or you can find the latest bestsellers at your nearest, big chain bookstore, such as Barnes & Noble or Borders. Or you can visit Amazon.com to buy the latest book from your favorite author. Amazon wins the convenience position for bookselling. Many local bookstores are closing as a result. They fell into the fidelity belly because the experience they offered didn’t beat Amazon’s ease of use.

“Adding the right touch of fidelity to a high-convenience product or service, or the right touch of convenience to fidelity, can make for a powerful, competitor-beating concoction.”

Because high fidelity and high convenience are both so desirable, you might think that a product with both would be an instant success. A closer look at fidelity proves this theory wrong. For example, Coach handbags enjoyed huge success as a high-fidelity brand. Then the firm tried to make its product more affordable by creating the “accessible luxury” category. By becoming more available to the mass market, Coach sacrificed its aura of exclusivity and panache. Coach bags were no longer a status symbol, and the brand sunk into the fidelity belly. Similarly, fidelity diminishes convenience. McDonald’s tried several times to introduce table service, but it always failed. People come to McDonald’s for convenience; they don’t want to wait for their food.

“The fidelity belly [is] a place where neither the fidelity nor the convenience is good enough to attract a mass-market audience.”

Corning was known for high-quality fiber optics, but when the telecom industry hit hard times the demand for fiber plummeted. CEO Wendell Weeks decided to keep focusing on fidelity for glass-based products through research, commitment and long-range planning. By 2008, Corning once again owned the top-quality niche. Other firms that hold the high-fidelity position in their markets include Apple in smart phones, Louis Vuitton in handbags, Whole Foods Market in grocery stores and Cirque du Soleil in live entertainment. Bose’s clunky, expensive headphones captured the high-fidelity slot and became an identity and status symbol for travelers who love the “noise-canceling” feature. MTV hit the convenience jackpot in the early ’80s when it offered music fans a simple way to hear and see their favorite bands. Disney owns the quality niche in amusement parks, but Six Flags wins on convenience. Six Flags built its parks in very accessible places and it sells tickets for lower prices. Their tagline sums it up: “Bigger than Disneyland; closer to home.”

Belly Up or Belly Out?

While not every product or service can dominate its market’s quality or convenience position, even products that are not absolute leaders can still succeed. For example, not every band can put on a show on the scale of a U2 spectacle, but people will still buy tickets to hear a live band in a small venue to gain a quality experience rather than listening to the same band’s CD at home.

“Most of the time, a new product or service starts off inside the fidelity belly and gradually migrates out to become successful.”

While most new products begin in the fidelity belly, some emerge and some do not. Joost, a technologically driven, forward-thinking company, set out to deliver network TV programs via the Internet. However, when Joost launched, its program quality was poor and it required complex, downloaded software, so it was inconvenient. Hulu took Joost’s niche because it focused on convenience and didn’t require downloaded software. People could watch TV shows easily. Joost did not ask, “Is our product on a clear path toward either convenience or fidelity?” Hulu did. A company must answer this question to find its way out of the fidelity belly.

Winners and Losers

For years, newspapers were the easiest, cheapest and best way to get the daily news. But once the Internet became free and more accessible than print media, newspapers found themselves deep in the fidelity belly. Moreover, as Web news improved, newspapers began cutting staff and closing bureaus, thus sacrificing their fidelity. How can newspapers crawl out of the fidelity belly? One strategy might be to focus on older readers who still read newspapers and to produce a high-fidelity product for them. Or newspapers could eliminate their print products altogether and reinvent themselves on the Web.

“When anything – a brand, a rock band, a style of clothing – becomes popular with a huge mass market, the cool people increasingly find it uncool and look for something new.”

Apple once sank into the fidelity belly, but it fought its way out. In 1984 its computers had a reputation as hip machines for creative people. However, when management forced Steve Jobs to leave in the mid-’80s, Apple lost its fidelity focus. By the ’90s, it was losing money. When Jobs returned in 1996, he refocused Apple on quality. Today, it owns the high-fidelity slot again. Now Starbucks faces the same transition. Its founder, Howard Schultz, revolutionized U.S. coffee drinking when he decided to create a high-fidelity experience. Treating yourself to a Starbucks half-caf skinny latté had enough panache to make people willing to pay a premium price for the experience. However, the chain then built on its success with a huge expansion. Soon every corner had a Starbucks. As it became common, its convenience undermined its aura. Schultz is once again trying to refocus on fidelity, closing many locations and improving product quality.

Game Changers

Most businesses make small product or service innovations to move up the fidelity scale or to become more convenient. However, once in a great while, a new product comes along that changes everything. These big innovations that transform a market are rare, but they happen more often in static, complacent industries that are ripe for shaking up or in fast-paced markets that rely on new technology. The Roomba robotic vacuum cleaner, from inventor Colin Angle’s company, iRobot, was a game-changing innovation in 2002. It cleans as it scoots around a room by itself, but it sells at a price that competes with other vacuum cleaners; iRobot sold more than two million Roombas in its first two years in business.

“Although achieving the highest fidelity is a great niche to occupy in a category, maintaining that position can be difficult.”

In the ’70s, People Express challenged the airline industry by offering dirt-cheap fares. It sacrificed fidelity and didn’t offer meals, first-class seats or movies. Because its tickets were so inexpensive, it grew quickly into the fifth largest airline in the U.S. Then, American Airlines started using a yield management program to lower its fares and began to compete with People Express on price while beating it on fidelity. Having lost its advantage, People Express declared bankruptcy in 1996.

“Early disasters aren’t necessarily disasters forever, and early victories don’t guarantee long-term success.”

When considering a new opportunity, try to determine where it fits on the fidelity versus convenience continuum. This trade-off can help you identify market openings. First, look for a product’s domination of a cost or fidelity niche, then see where you can insert your innovation. Fred Smith, who founded Federal Express, spotted the gap in overnight delivery service that the U.S. Post Office didn’t fill. He launched FedEx in 1971. In 2007, its revenues topped $35 billion.

About the Author

Kevin Maney is the author of two books and a contributor to Fortune, The Atlantic and Wired magazines. He was the technology writer for USA Today for 20 years.


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Trade-Off

Book Trade-Off

Why Some Things Catch On, and Others Don't. The Ever-Present Tension Between Quality and Convenience

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